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Abstract 
 
One of the foundations of the labour theory of value used by Ricardo in the Principles is that rent does 
not enter into commodity prices. In response to objections raised by Malthus and Say, Ricardo 
defended this idea by arguing that even where all cultivated land pays rent, the last dose of capital 
employed on the land does not and no rent is therefore involved in the price of the product of this 
capital. We will show that this claim, which has been believed true by several generations of 
economists, is based on a misleading argument and in fact incorrect. 
In particular, we will show that the intensive differential rent paid on land of the worst quality under 
cultivation enters into the agricultural product price and so, even in the most favourable case, 
commodities are no longer exchanged at a ratio corresponding to the relative quantities of labour they 
embody. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 The primary result of Ricardo’s analysis is undoubtedly the presence of an inverse 
relationship between the wage rate and the rate of profit. With the aid of the labour theory of value, 
Ricardo succeeded where Adam Smith had failed and pinpointed the link between profits and 
wages. 
 Although many of Ricardo’s conclusions have been shown to be valid in general, his 
arguments are strongly based on the hypothesis that commodities are exchanged with one other at a 
ratio determined by the quantities of labour they embody.1 He was therefore obliged first to deny 
Smith’s claim that prices are not determined by the labour they embody in a developed country and 
second to refute the objections raised by Say and Malthus. 
 As is well known, Ricardo’s labour theory of value is essentially grounded on two 
assertions: i) that the employment of capital in the production of each commodity is proportional to 
the employment of labour; ii) that rent is not a component part of the prices of commodities. The 
first was intended as an approximation, in the sense that exceptions were possible and their 
relevance should be judged case by case. The second is instead a result that Ricardo believed he had 
established through his theory of differential rent. We shall focus here solely on the latter, as the 
former has already received a great deal of attention. 
 If extensive differential rent were the only possible form, then Ricardo’s result would hold, 
as the price of agricultural products would be determined in this case by the cost of production on 
the least fertile land under cultivation, and land of this quality pays no extensive differential rent at 
all. Ricardo therefore appears to have found a reply to Smith’s idea of rent as a component part of 
commodity prices: 
 
“that corn which is produced by the greatest quantity of labour is the regulator of the price of corn; and 
rent does not and cannot enter in the last degree as a component part of its price. Adam Smith, therefore, 
cannot be correct in supposing that the original rule which regulated the exchangeable value of 
commodities, namely, the comparative quantity of labour by which they were produced, can be altered by 
the appropriation of land and payment of rent. Raw material enters into the composition of most 
commodities, but the value of that raw material, as well as corn, is regulated by the productiveness of the 
portion of capital last employed on land, and paying no rent; and therefore rent is not a component part of 
the price of commodities.” (Ricardo 1951-73: vol. 1, p. 46) 
 
                                                
1
 “Ricardo’s basic theorem on distribution—‘a rise of wages ... would invariably lower profits’—is thus strictly 
dependent on his measure of value” (Stigler 1952, p. 203). 
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 Although differences in the quality of land always involve extensive differential rent, 
however, it can hardly be maintained that the rents of landowners consist exclusively of this 
element. Where every piece of land is owned, there is clearly no land that is cultivated without the 
payment of rent to the owner. This is the objection Say raised against Ricardo’s theory. 
In a letter to Say dated 11th January 1820, Ricardo replies to this point as follows: 
 
“You appear to me to have mistaken also an opinion of mine on which you comment in a note of the 
translation of my book. My argument respecting rent, profit and taxes, is founded on a supposition that 
there is land in every country which pays no rent, or that there is capital employed on land before in 
cultivation for which no rent is paid. You answer the first proposition, but take no notice of the second. 
The admission of either will answer my purpose.” (Ricardo 1951-73: vol. 8, pp. 149, 150) 
 
In the first place, Ricardo expressly states that the presence of rent-free land is a 
“supposition”, something admittedly not proven. In the second, he does not reject Say’s argument 
that there is no cultivated land yielding no rent to its owner, which is also summed up in a note2 to 
Chapter XXXII of the Principles. He confines himself to defending his theory on the basis of 
intensive differential rent,3 arguing that even if Say were right to believe that all the cultivated land 
received rent, the last dose of capital employed on this land would still pay no rent and his theory 
would thus be valid in any case. 
We also find this argument stated in an earlier letter of Ricardo to James Mill, dated 
December 22nd 1818, in which he reports on a discussion with Malthus: 
 
“He [Malthus] has altered his opinion you know about there being land in every country which pays no 
rent, and appears like M. Say to think that when that is proved, my doctrine of rent not entering into price 
is overthrown – they neither of them advert to the other principle which cannot be touched, of capital 
being employed on land, already in cultivation, which pays no rent.” (Ricardo 1951-73: vol. 7, p. 372) 
 
 The ultimate foundation of Ricardo’s idea that rent does not enter into the price of 
commodities therefore appears to be the theory of intensive differential rent. 
                                                
2
 “M. Say, in his notes to the French translation of this work, has endeavoured to show that there is not at any time land 
in cultivation which does not pay a rent, and having satisfied himself on this point, he concludes that he has overturned 
all the conclusions which result from that doctrine.” (Ricardo 1951-73: vol. 1, p. 413) 
3
 Samuelson (1959, p. 9, footnote 2) proposed a reformulation of the Ricardian theory of rent in terms of differential 
calculus and marginal productivity. In this case, assuming a continuum of different qualities of land – as in von Thunen 
theory for example – the extensive differential rent would be compatible with a situation in which almost every 
cultivated land yelds a rent to its proprietor. But clearly this was not the case considered by Ricardo, since he explicitly 
referred to the intensive rent. 
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 Ricardo ultimately succeeded in defending his idea and convincing several generations of 
economists4 that even though all cultivated land receives rent, the last dose of capital employed on 
land pays no rent and therefore rent does not enter into the price of commodities. 
With the aid of Sraffa’s rigorous restatement of differential rent theory5, we intend to show 
here that Ricardo’s argument about intensive rent is misleading and the widely accepted conclusion 
that intensive rent does not enter into the price of agricultural commodities is incorrect. 
In particular, after restating Ricardo’s argument, we shall analyse the increase in intensive 
differential rent from a different point of view and, using the same data as Ricardo’s example, show 
that it enters into the (relative) price of corn. As a result, when there are intensive rents, 
commodities cannot be exchanged at prices determined by the embodied quantities of labour. 
 
 
2. Ricardo’s argument 
 
 Ricardo presents his theory of intensive differential rent by means of an example in the 
second chapter of the Principles. He imagines that a capital of £1,000 – which can be regarded as 
wages anticipated at the beginning of the year – applied on an acre of the most fertile land gives an 
output of 100 quarters of corn, whereas the same capital applied on an acre of less fertile land 
would give 80 quarters. He then observes that if the application of a second £1,000 of capital on an 
acre of the most fertile land gave rise to an increase in product of 85 quarters, this use of capital 
would be clearly more advantageous, where possible, than the cultivation of less fertile land. 
In this case, rent arises even without different qualities of land being cultivated, in that 
Ricardo views the difference between the 100 quarters obtained by the first dose of capital and the 
85 quarters obtained with the second – i.e. 15 quarters, or the value of 15 quarters – as representing 
the landowner’s rent for an acre. The amount of (gross) profit on a capital of £1,000 is thus the 
equivalent of 85 quarters of corn for the first investment of capital as well as the second. Ricardo 
concludes that: 
 
“the capital last employed pays no rent. For the greater productive powers of the first £1000, fifteen 
quarters is paid for rent, for the employment of the second £1,000 no rent whatever is paid.” (Ricardo 
1951-73: vol. 1, p. 72) 
 
                                                
4
 Authoritative examples include Marshall (1893, p. 86) and S. Hollander (1979, p. 203). 
5
 We refer in particular to the analysis described by Sraffa (1960: 75, 76 - §§ 87, 88) and put into formal terms and 
developed in greater depth by various economists, including Montani (1975), Kurz (1978), Guichard (1982) and 
D’Agata (1983). Cf. also: Kurz and Salvadori (1995, p. 289). 
 5 
 Though capable of showing that more intense cultivation of the most fertile land can be 
more advantageous than cultivating inferior land, Ricardo’s argument in no way proves that rent 
does not enter into the price of corn. 
The arbitrary division of capital into doses of £1,000 each is in fact misleading and induces 
the reader to believe that the last dose of capital employed alone gives an output of 85 quarters of 
corn. In other words, these 85 quarters seems to be the product of £1,000 capital, without any 
(further) employment of land. This impression is incorrect, however, because corn cannot be 
produced without land. 
The application of a second dose of capital on the most fertile land derives, as Sraffa shows, 
from the possibility of cultivating land of this quality by two alternative methods. With the first, 
method α, 100 quarters of corn are obtained by employing a capital of £1,000 on an acre of land, 
which means that one quarter of corn is obtained with a capital of £10 and 0.01 acres of land. With 
the second, β, 185 quarters are produced by employing a capital of £2,000 on an acre of land, and 
so the production of one quarter of corn requires a capital of £10.81 and 0.0054 acres of land. Corn 
is produced by means of capital and land both with method α and with method β. 
As a result, when the rent rate is equal to the value of 15 quarters of corn, every single unit 
of capital employed pays a rent. In particular, every £1 of capital employed pays a rent 
corresponding to the value of 0.015 quarters of corn with method α and 0.0075 quarters with 
method β. 
 With his doses of capital, Ricardo instead seeks to present method β as a combination of 
method α and a third method making it possible produce corn with no land. The argument is 
misleading, however, since Ricardo then uses this imaginary third method to prove that rent does 
not enter into the price of corn. 
If there were a method of producing corn without land, it would be a mere truism to assert 
that rent does not enter into the cost of producing corn. No such method exists, however, because 
the investment of the second dose of capital cannot take place independently of the first. The fact 
that the second dose of capital is not employed with a third independent method becomes clear 
when we observe that, according to Ricardo’s reasoning, a change in the quantity of corn obtained 
from £1,000 with method α – from the first dose of capital – would entail a change in the amount of 
product obtained from the last dose of capital.6 
                                                
6
 For example, if capital became more productive with method α, so that £1,000 capital produced 110 quarters of corn 
per acre, the quantity of corn obtained with the second dose of capital would be reduced to 75 quarters because the 
quantity produced by method β (185 quarters per acre), being a well-defined method of production, is independent of 
any improvement in method α. As a result, the second dose of capital cannot be regarded as employed with a third 
independent method. 
 6 
Ricardo’s conclusion thus collapses. Whenever rent is paid for the use of land of a certain 
quality, every single unit of capital invested on that land pays a rent. As a result, if an intensive 
differential rent is due for the last piece of land under cultivation, then rent enters into the price of 
corn. This is proved in the next section by means of a simple example based on the same data used 
here. 
 
 
3. A different argument 
 
 Let us consider an example with only two commodities: an agricultural product, say “corn”, 
and an industrial product, say “steel”. 
Let us assume that capital in each sector consists exclusively of wages paid in advance for 
the period of production, which is one year in both sectors. As a result, capital and profits can 
clearly be seen to be proportional to the employment of labour in each sector. If rents do not enter 
into the price of commodities, as Ricardo claims, they should therefore be exchanged at a relative 
price equal to the ratio of the amounts of labour they embody. 
An experiment in comparative statics may help to clarify this point. We shall consider two 
cases. In the first, only one method of corn production is known, namely β, the more capital and 
labour-intensive of the two methods in Ricardo’s example. In the second, two methods of corn 
production – α and β – are known and can coexist on land of uniform quality, as in Ricardo. In both 
cases, the total quantities to be produced are fixed and equal to 740 quarters of corn and 25 tons of 
steel. The surface area of uniform land available is also fixed and equal to 6 acres. 
In the first case, 185 quarters of corn are produced with 20 units of labour per acre of land, 
while one ton of steel is produced with 2 units of labour and no employment of land. As a result, 
only 4 of the 6 acres of land are required to obtain 740 quarters of corn and 25 tons of steel. In other 
words, the availability of land is in excess of production requirements and the differential rent is 
therefore zero. 
If we use w and r respectively to denote the wage rate7 and the profit rate, the prices of corn 
and steel, pc and ps, must therefore be such that: 
 
20 w (1 + r) = 185 pc  (1) 
2 w (1 + r) = ps  (2) 
 
                                                
7
 We assume w = £100, so that the capital employed on an acre of land with method β is £2000, as in Ricardo’s 
example. 
 7 
The price of corn in terms of steel is 2/37 and therefore equal to the ratio of the quantities of 
labour embodied, which are 20/185 (= 4/37) in each quarter of corn and 2 in each ton of steel. 
 In the second case, method α is also known and can be used to produce 100 quarters of corn 
with 10 units of labour per acre of land. 
 If the rent rate were at the zero level, this method would be cheaper because less labour is 
employed per quarter of corn. Due to the scarcity of land, however, the use of this method alone 
would allow the production of only 600 quarters of corn as against the 740 required by the market. 
Methods α and β must therefore necessarily coexist and the rent must rise in order to make the unit 
costs identical within the two methods.8 
 When the rent reaches this level, the 6 acres of land will be entirely cultivated: 1.65 acres (1 
acre, 2 roods and 24 perches) with the old method (β) and 4.35 acres (4 acres, 1 rood and 16 
perches) with the new one (α). 
 In this case, the prices pc and ps and the rent rate ρ must be such that9: 
 
20 w (1 + r) + ρ = 185 pc  (3) 
10 w (1 + r) + ρ = 100 pc  (4) 
2 w (1 + r) = ps   (5) 
 
By solving system (3)-(5), we obtain the result that the rent rate ρ is equal to the value of 15 
quarters of corn, as in Ricardo’s example, and the relative price of corn is now 2/34, which means a 
rise in the price of corn respect the previous case. 
Moreover, the quantity of labour embodied in a quarter of corn produced with the least 
favourable method10 remains unchanged, so that the relative quantities of labour embodied in corn 
and steel are 2/37 in this case as well. The price of corn therefore rises with no change in the 
                                                
8
 Until 740 quarters of corn are produced, the price of corn is above its cost of production with method α and 
agricultural producers therefore obtain extra profits. Since the six acres of land are entirely cultivated, the classical 
mechanism of capitalistic competition allows landowners to appropriate the extra profits in the form of rents. The rising 
rents tend to increase the unit cost of production with method α with respect to the unit cost with method β. This 
process goes on until the unit cost of production for corn is the same with both methods. 
9
 As regards the equations determining intensive differential rent simultaneously to prices, we consider the analysis put 
forward by Sraffa (1960, pp. 75, 76 - §§ 87, 88) and later put into formal terms by various authors, in particular, 
Montani (1975, pp. 80 – 83), Kurz (1978, pp. 26 – 34) and Kurz and Salvadori (1995, p. 289). Equations (3)-(5) are the 
same as though found there but written for the simple example addressed. It is also worth observing that although Sraffa 
and the scholars mentioned above have a correct theory of intensive differential rent, they fail to note that it can be used 
to refute Ricardo’s conclusions about rent and the labour theory of value (for a discussion of the differences between 
Sraffa’s and Ricardo’s theory of rent see also Fratini, 2008). 
10
 As Ricardo pointed out, “that corn which is produced by the greatest quantity of labour is the regulator of the price of 
corn”, i.e. in order to determine the relative value of the two commodities in labour embodied we must consider only 
the most labour intensive method of production of corn, which is, in our case, method β. 
 8 
relative amount of labour embodied.11 Rent does enter into the price of corn and causes an increase 
with respect to the level corresponding to the relative quantities of labour embodied. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 Contrary to what Ricardo claims and many economists have since believed, if the last piece 
of land under cultivation receives intensive differential rent, it enters into the price of corn or 
agricultural products in general. 
This has been proved by means of Ricardo’s own example. In particular, even assuming that 
capital in each sector consists exclusively of wages anticipated for one year, we have shown that in 
the presence of intensive differential rent, the relative price of commodities cannot be equal to the 
ratio of the quantity of labour they embody. 
The argument Ricardo used in replying to the objections of Malthus and Say is therefore 
incorrect. They were right to argue that Ricardo’s idea of rent not entering into the price of 
commodities is based on the presence of cultivated lands which pay no rent, a situation to be found 
only in very particular cases, such as a newly colonised country. But where all cultivated land pays 
a rent, which seems to be the general case, rent is an element of the cost and the price of agricultural 
commodities. 
 This result also rehabilitates an assertion made by Adam Smith and criticised by Ricardo. In 
countries where all the land is owned and all cultivated land pays a rent, the “original rule” is in fact 
altered in that the price of commodities is no longer determined by the relative quantity of labour 
embodied. In conclusion, therefore: 
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 It is worth observing that, as Sraffa remarks (1960, 75), the relative price of corn in terms of steel can be determined 
by a system in which land does not appear. This possibility has been studied in general and formal terms by Guichard 
(1982).  
For the simple case addressed here, we can subtract equation (4) from equation (3) to obtain: 
 
10 w (1 + r) = 85 pc  (6) 
 
and use equations (5) and (6) in order to determine the relative price of the two commodities and the rate of profit. 
 This procedure is certainly correct in formal terms and, contrary to what one might think, makes no difference 
to our argument. The relative price of corn determined by solving equations (5) and (6) must be 2/34 here too and the 
ratio between the quantities of labour embodied in the two commodities is still 2/37.  
Great care must in fact be taken not to infer from equation (6) that 85 quarters of corn embodies 10 unit of 
labour. This would be true if 85 quarters were the gross product obtained by the employment of 10 workers with the 
least favourable method, i.e. if equation (6) had exactly the same economic meaning as equation (3). But this is not so. 
The 85 quarters of corn in equation (6) are not the gross product of 10 workers (which is, on the contrary, 100 quarters 
with method α and 92.5 with method β), but a physical amount of gross profits. More precisely, equation (6) tells us 
only that a capital of 10w employed in agriculture must earn the value of 85 quarters of corn as gross profits regardless 
of the method used. 
There is thus no contradiction between our result and the possibility of eliminating land from the system 
referred to by Sraffa and Guichard. 
 9 
 
“As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the landlords, like all other men, 
love to reap where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce. The wood of the 
forest, the grass of the field, and all the natural fruits of the earth, which, when land was in common, cost 
the labourer only the trouble of gathering them, come, even to him, to have an additional price fixed upon 
them. He must then pay for the licence to gather them; and must give up to the landlord a portion of what 
his labour either collects or produces. This portion, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of this 
portion, constitutes the rent of land, and in the price of the greater part of commodities makes a third 
component part.” (Smith 1976: vol. 2, p. 67 – I.vi.8) 
 
 
Appendix. Another example 
 
The present paper, it is now clear, is aimed at showing that intensive differential rent enters 
into the price of agricultural products. This result, in the main part of the paper, has been reached 
assuming that capital consists exclusively of wages anticipated at the beginning of the year and 
proving that, even under this assumption, commodities do not exchange at a ratio determined by the 
embodied quantities of labour when intensive differential rent is paid for the use of land. Here we 
will get the same result by a different argument: we will consider a case with a non-basic 
agricultural commodity and intensive rent – a case which we find, for example, both in Montani 
(1975) and in Kurz (1978) – in order to show that the latter enters into the price of the former. 
In particular, following Montani’s example12, let us assume there are two commodities: an 
industrial and basic commodity, named commodity “a”, which is also the numeraire; and an 
agricultural and non-basic commodity, named commodity “z”.  
As for technology, there is a method for the production of “a”, and two different methods for 
the production of “z”, named “α” and “β”. In symbols: 
 
aa  units of “a”  &  a  units of labour    1 unit of “a” 
α
za  units of “a”  &  
α
z  units of labour  &  
αλ  units of land    1 unit of “z” 
β
za  units of “a”  &  
β
z  units of labour  &  βλ  units of land    1 unit of “z” 
 
with αλ  > βλ , i.e. method “β” gives a greater output per unit of land. 
If both the methods have to be in use in order to fully supply the demand for “z”, then, given 
a post-factum wage rate w (or a profit rate r), the profit rate r (or the wage rate w), the rent rate ρ 
                                                
12
 A similar case can be found in Kurz (1978), pp. 26-28. 
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and the price of “z” pz in terms of “a” are determine, according to Sraffa’s theory, by solving the 
system: 
 
1w)r1(a aa =++     (A.1) 
zzz pw)r1(a =ρλ+++ ααα    (A.2) 
zzz pw)r1(a =ρλ+++ βββ    (A.3) 
 
Therefore, given the wage rate level w*, and determined the corresponding profit rate r* by 
equation (A.1), we can use equations (A.2) and (A.3) – as both Montani and Kurz did – in order to 
obtain the “price-rent relation” implied by each of the two methods. More precisely, let us denote 
by cα and cβ the unit cost of production13 of “z” using respectively method α and β, then by 
equations (A.2) and (A.3) we have: 
 
αααα
=ρλ+++ c*w*)r1(a zz    (A.4) 
ββββ
=ρλ+++ c*w*)r1(a zz    (A.5) 
 
Leaving aside the details – for which we refer the reader to Montani’s and Kurz’s mentioned 
articles – equations (A.4) and (A.5) imply the functions plotted in fig. 1. 
Looking at fig. 1, it appears clearly that intensive differential rent enters into the unit cost 
with both the methods14, although in different amount, and then into the price of “z” in terms of “a”. 
The unit costs cα and cβ are both increasing functions of the rent rate but being αλ  > βλ , cα grows 
faster than cβ when the rent rate increases. There is, therefore, a positive rent rate ρ which allows cα 
to catch up with cβ, and, in so doing, allows the two production methods to be simultaneously in 
use. And this rent rate level makes the price pz greater than the costs for wages and gross profits 
both with method α – i.e. the length of segment OR in fig. 1 – and with method β – the length of 
segment OS. 
 
                                                
13
 It is worth noting that Montani (1975, p. 81) – as well as Kurz (1978, p. 27) – does not include the intensive 
differential rent into the unit cost of production of commodity “z”. Then, he is considering a notion of cost which 
excludes entrepreneur’s revenues and is assuming (implicitly) that landowners organize the production; in this case, 
infact, rents are viewed as a residuum. But adopting the notion of full-cost, as we are doing here, rents must be included 
into the cost of production of commodity “z” (even in the case of landowners as entrepreneurs). 
14
 Our fig. 1 is identical to fig. 4 in Montani (1975, p. 81) and to fig. 3 in Kurz (1978, p. 28), however they seem to use 
it only in order to show the existence, under certain conditions, of economically meaningful solutions for the equations 
(A.1), (A.2) and (A.3). Here the same figure is used with a different aim. 
 11 
Fig. 1 
 
 
In conclusion, the intensive differential rent ρ is entered into the price pz. Here we can easily 
say that because “z” is a non-basic commodity, and therefore the part of its cost formed by wages 
and gross profits is unaffected by changes in the rent rate. In this case rents are clearly in addition to 
this part. Something similar happens in the case of Ricardo treated above, where capital was 
assumed to consist of anticipated wages only (and therefore no basic commodity exists). In more 
general case, the linkage between intensive differential rent and the price of agricultural products is 
decidedly more complex. 
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